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Stranger in a Strange Land: An Outsider's View of
Antitrust and the Courts
Neil Komesar*
What I know about antitrust law and economics has been learned
largely from reading the papers of this conference and listening to their
presentation. I am an antitrust ignoramus or at least an antitrust
innocent. My participation in the conference was induced by one of its
organizers, Spencer Waller, who has ably used my comparative
institutional approach to analyze antitrust law and felt that I might lend
a "fresh perspective." As I note later in this paper, ignorance can make
a fresh perspective expensive. Still, after some reflection on the many
interesting observations on antitrust offered at the conference, I am
offering a brief comparative institutional perspective on the role of
courts in antitrust.
It seems that the landscape of antitrust decision-making described at
the conference is particularly ill-suited for a significant role for the
courts-the adjudicative process-either in the form of judicial review
or private damage actions. Since the former is the basis for legal
scholarship on antitrust and the latter represents much of the practice of
antitrust law in the United States, I am unlikely to make many friends
with this position. But I suppose that is an advantage of being an
outsider.
Let me start with the insight that antitrust administrative agencies are
highly imperfect decision-makers that make many mistakes. I can say
this without much knowledge of the actual workings of antitrust
because, at high numbers and complexity, all decision-making
alternatives are highly imperfect and all decision-makers make many
mistakes.' And in the antitrust context, there are large numbers of
* Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. My thanks to
Spencer Waller and Paul Olszowka for their comments on various drafts.
1. I have expanded on this point in NEIL KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE ROLE OF COURTS,
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001) [hereinafter LAW'S
LIMITS], and Spencer Waller has introduced this insight to antitrust. See Spencer Weber Waller,
The Future of Monopoly and Monopolization Symposium: Areeda, Epithets, and Essential
Facilities, 2008 Wis. L. REv. 359 (2008); Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller,
Revitalizing Essential Facilities,75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008).
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people and business entities impacted by highly complex business
arrangements with highly complex implications. But these insights do
not make the case for augmenting the decision-making of these
imperfect administrative agencies with court-based judicial review or
private damage actions. The most obvious point here is that the
adjudicative process almost always has less expertise than
administrative agencies. Generalist appellate court judges, trial court
judges, and especially juries, lack training and experience when
compared to agency employed specialists. There are, of course, federal
judges like Richard Posner with expertise in the law and economics of
2
antitrust. But few are as well versed in antitrust law as Judge Posner.
And even someone as able as Judge Posner may not have the
information or insights of antitrust agency specialists, who are
augmented by the economic experts at their disposal.
The case for judicial review or private litigation hardly ever lies in
better expertise. Instead, it lies in lessening bias. This tradeoff between
expertise and bias is an essential piece of the analysis of the role of the
judicial or adjudicative process in general.
Doubts about the
competence of judges and juries as decision-makers have been with us
probably as long as judges and juries. 3 There is little doubt that juries
have limited technical expertise and sophistication. Jurors are randomly
chosen from the general population, and individual jurors are often
chosen in the voir dire explicitly to avoid expertise in the specific
technical issue of the case. These inexpert juries are then asked to listen
to the technical and complex testimony of conflicting expert witnesses
and decide difficult substantive issues. Similarly, trial and appellate
judges formally trained only as lawyers and coming from a wide variety
of practice backgrounds are regularly asked to judge the facts in and
fashion the rules for complex litigation, like antitrust. Most judges,
both trial and appellate, do not specialize in one type of controversy
and, therefore, do not obtain the expertise that such frequent exposure
would bring.
Juries and judges can easily be unfavorably contrasted with the
technically more expert bureaucrats of administrative agencies who, like
juries and judges, serve as fact-finders and implement rules and
standards. From a comparative institutional standpoint, this lack of
expertise may be discomforting, but the criticism is, as it stands, only a
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Richard
A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
3. For a summary of some of this literature, see NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 138-39 (1994) [hereinafter
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES].
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parade of horribles. It is single institutional. Comparative institutional
analysis requires the parallel consideration of the institutional
alternatives-in this case, more expert administrative agencies.
From the perspective of technical expertise, these agencies with their
narrower scope and more specialized staffing are superior to generalist
trial court judges and randomly chosen juries. But, these same factors,
in some settings, provide advantages to juries and judges. The very
characteristics that make juries less expert make them less subject to
systematic influence and bias. Systematic bias is associated with the
skewed distribution of stakes where, in highly complex contexts,
concentrated interests with small number of members and high per
capita stakes are over-represented relative to highly dispersed interests
whose many members have low per capita stakes. This is a common
enough vision of the political process captured in terms like special
interest legislation and captured agency. I have come to call it
many ways
"minoritarian bias" to contrast it with the more rare, but in
4
more dangerous, political malfunction "majoritarian bias."
The transient jury is not a good target for one-sided efforts at
influence associated with minoritarian bias and the skewed distribution
of stakes. The constantly changing jury is difficult to influence through
continuous long-term contact and propaganda. Judges, barricaded by
procedures as well as the rotation among types of cases, are also
difficult targets for influence. The parties are forced to sway the jury or
judge by advocacy in the more formally confined adversarial process,
where opposing parties have more equal opportunities to present their
viewpoints. In addition, the random jury selection process makes any
attempt to staff the jury with cronies extremely difficult, if not
impossible. Although inducement, for example, in the form of bribes, is
not unknown, it is unlikely both because juries and judges are, to a
considerable degree, removed from informal contact with the relevant
interests during deliberation. In addition, the costs of bribery, including
possible criminal sanctions, are seldom worth incurring when the
bribery, especially in the case of juries, will cover only one case rather
than a large set of cases.
Administrative agencies, in contrast, are fixed targets hearing many
cases of a particular type and are easier and more worthwhile to
influence via activities like propaganda, lobbying, bribery, or restaffing.
In their random choice from the general population and their greater
4. The story of minoritarian bias, majoritarian bias, and the two-force model of politics is
developed extensively in IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 3, and LAW'S LIMITS, supra
note 1.
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resistance to minoritarian bias, juries provide a form of majoritarian
influence within the adjudicative process; therefore, their use must be
considered in terms of the character of the social issue to be decided.
As a general matter, where the conditions for strong minoritarian bias
are present, the jury's advantages are significant and may outweigh lack
of expertise even in a complex setting.
As a general matter, the choice between the political process and the
adjudicative process involves a tradeoff between the amount of
information and the possibility of one-sided or biased information. The
insulation that makes judges and juries more independent also separates
them from a great deal of information about the desires and needs of the
public. In politics, public officials must understand the wants and needs
of the general public or at least powerful parts of the general public to
remain in office or obtain higher office. These interests link political
officials to the populace and provide them with more robust information
on desires and needs. This information provides the weights to be given
the various opposing public policy positions or options. The problem
with all this informality and interdependence is that under the wrong
conditions-particularly the skewed distribution of stakes-these
informal channels can carry a severely distorted view of public needs.
By contrast, judges and juries stand aloof. They depend on others to
convince them by evidence and reason, but they do not depend on these
others for their jobs and livelihood. The adversarial process attempts to
equalize the representation of positions and the delivery of information
by assuring that both positions are at least formally represented and that
information reaching judge and jury is confined to what opposing
advocates present to them.
The tradeoff is between a political process that integrates far more
information but with a more significant risk of bias and an adjudicative
process that suppresses information but decreases distortions in its
presentation. This tradeoff between information and evenhandednessand more generally between expertise and bias-is among the most
difficult issues in institutional choice.
We can now examine this issue in the context of antitrust. Where
expert administrative agencies hear only one side of the issue or are
bent by incentives from political sources that are one-sided, expertise
can be of limited advantage. There are many areas of political process
decision-making, including many areas of administrative agency
decision-making, that are subject to one-sided representation or
participation and, therefore, may be in need of the less biased judicial
process. But antitrust does not stand out as one of them.
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There is certainly a very large group that is unlikely to take an active
role in the antitrust regulatory process: consumers. When an observed
market practice is subjected to the scrutiny of antitrust administrative
agencies, consumers are unlikely to be directly represented. This is the
classic problem of the dormancy of large dispersed interests whose
members have low per capita stakes. But from the description I heard at
the conference, the consumer position is likely to be represented
vociferously by either the perpetrators of the market practice or their
competitors who oppose the market practice.
This of course, begs the crucial question: who is really on the side of
the consumers-the perpetrators or the complainants? One only knows
this by making the essential and difficult determination whether the
practice in question-merger or other contractual or marketing
arrangement-is "pro-competitive or anti-competitive" or "proconsumer or anti-consumer"?
This pro-competitive versus anticompetitive decision is a tough choice, and antitrust administrative
agencies sometimes, possibly often, get it wrong, but not because they
are hearing only one side of the story.
At the conference, many presenters made the argument that judicial
review of antitrust decisions would be highly beneficial. None was
more forceful than David Evans, an economist who asserted that the
experts at the agencies may become too parochial or inbred-what he
described colorfully as "breathing their own fumes." I am not in a
position to validate or challenge this description. But even if I assume
its validity, it does not make a strong case for substituting the
cumbersome and inexpert process of judicial review. That would be an
especially costly "fresh perspective." Would the adjudicative process
reverse bad decisions? Of course, but not any more frequently than it
would reverse good ones. As several commentators pointed out,
inexpert judicial reviewers have a tendency to substitute procedure for
substance, calling for further hearings or findings of fact. Increased
procedural due process or findings can be a valuable antidote to
minoritarian bias by providing more information to the public and
thereby decreasing the dormancy of the dispersed majority. They can
also provide information to reviewers in either the adjudicative process
or the political process where that review is justified. But all this
supposes a one-sided antitrust decision-making and there is very little
evidence for that.
Breathing one's fumes may fairly describe decision-making at high
numbers and complexity. The same experts may continuously make the
same points at the same conferences and perhaps fashion or habit
distorts the judgment of these experts and lessens the quality of their
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expertise. But substituting reviewers who know much less is a dubious
antidote.
Antitrust administrative agencies appear to be hearing both sides of
the story and presumably both sides are capable of the political process
activities necessary to more directly influence administrative agencies.
The resulting decision-making process is an expensive and highly
imperfect process with a great deal of rent seeking potential and,
therefore, a significant potential for wasting resources. Competitors
may attempt to use the agency to gain advantage. In turn, the agency
may be fooled into finding the productive anti-competitive or the anticompetitive productive. But if it does so, it is not because the decisionmaking process is systematically biased or one-sided. There may be a
case here for doing away with or narrowing the scope of antitrust
regulation. But there is no case for using the tool of judicial review
whose bias-correcting role is not needed and whose lack of expertise
will add unnecessary mistakes and expense.
With the possible exception of price fixing noted below, the case
against private damage actions in the antitrust context seems even
stronger than the case against judicial review. Private damage actions
seem to represent a large part of antitrust practice in the United States.
Perhaps it is too late to reverse this trend. But developing nations
looking to establish antitrust regimes or nations looking to reform their
processes should think twice-and maybe a few times more-before
they introduce this device. Courts and litigation are expensive, and the
dynamics of litigation has its own source of minoritarian bias captured
most simply in the absence of small claims, and more broadly in the
skewed investment in litigation by high stakes players relative to
interests that are more dispersed. More importantly, the process
involves highly inexpert decision-makers-in particular, juries. This
inexpertness will increase both the costs of litigation and the potential
for mistakes and can only bring out the worst gamesmanship of
litigation.
Despite these problems, I have argued for private damage actions in
other contexts. In some settings, a skewed distribution of stakes in the
market and political processes provide the error prone and expensive
adjudicative process with comparative institutional advantages. The
most straightforward examples of this advantage involve the social goal
of safety or prevention of accidents, where the adjudicative process,
operating through private actions for damages, sometimes faces a
different and more socially favorable distribution of stakes than does
either the market or the political process. The adjudicative process
faces this more favorable distribution because of the retrospective focus
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of private damage actions as opposed to the prospective focus of the
market and political processes.
This favorable difference occurs where a potential injury has a very
low probability of occurring but carries with it significant loss if the
event occurs. Many products injuries have this configuration. Before
the injury, potential victims have low per capita stakes because the
probability of the bad outcome is so low. However, after an injury
occurs, the class of victims is now a much smaller group of actual
victims with large per capita stakes.
The crucial distinction here is between ex ante and ex post
distributions of per capita stakes. In the market and political processes,
the relevant actors are potential victims and injurers. In the market,
they are the parties that buy and sell safety. In the political process,
they are the parties who seek or oppose safety regulation. Where we
have potential victims with low per capita stakes, we have a significant
chance of dormancy or mistaken decisions by this group. Combined
with high per capita stakes potential injurers, we get minoritarian bias in
the political process and manipulation of information and underproduction of safety devices in the market.
In the adjudicative process, however, it is actual victims and injurers
who are the litigants. Although these damage actions may have
significant prospective (deterrent) effects as their threat affects potential
injurers and, thereby, increase the safety of potential victims, it is
actual, not potential, victims and injurers whose litigation produces the
signal to potential injurers. Where we have high stakes actual victims,
we have an increased possibility of triggering the adjudicative process
because the large individual stakes justify individual private actions
(often as joint ventures with contingent-fee lawyers). This provides an
antidote to the one-sided activity associated with the ex ante skewed
distribution of stakes.
This comparative advantage exists, however, only where there is a
"shifted distribution"-where the victims' low distribution ex ante
becomes a high uniform distribution ex post. I have argued elsewhere
that the configuration of stakes in the shifted distribution creates both a
significant comparative advantage for private damage actions over
regulation and market transactions in settings like product and service
safety and, in turn, a potential need for judicial protection of that
advantage against the political process-protection that might even
5
produce serious constitutional judicial review of tort reform legislation.
5.

IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 3, at 153-95.

Another failure to shift the

distribution occurs when a low distribution ex ante remains a low distribution ex post. The actual
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But the situation in private antitrust actions presents quite a different
picture. Here, we have large per capita stakes actors both ex ante and ex
post. As we have seen, antitrust administrative agencies do not face
one-sided representation of the positions for or against a given market
practice. There is no skewed distribution ex ante. There are active
participants on both sides. The same remains true in the litigation
process, but now without the need for the augmentation of the signal
necessary with a skewed distribution ex ante. Put simply, this sort of
private action has all the costs of litigation, including the use of highly
inexpert decision-makers, without the benefit of the shifted distribution.
Because we have high per capita stakes both ex ante and ex post, the
result is significant litigation without a compensating correction of bias.
To me, it looks like the worst of rent seeking: wasted resources without
any net advantages even for the litigating competitors who may find
themselves as plaintiffs in some cases and defendants in others, thus
trapped in a negative-sum enterprise. This is a world in which only
lawyers clearly gain.
There is another dimension of the case against a significant role for
the courts in antitrust. Several presenters at the conference noted that
administrative agencies are, or can be, severely underfunded. This
appears worst in developing or poorer nations, but the complaint was
sounded even about the Federal Trade Commission. The implications
of increasing or decreasing the physical capacity (the scale) of any
institution are important in determining the ability of that institution.
But if the alternative to these supposedly underfunded administrative
agencies is the courts, we are substituting the institution most
constrained by scale. The constraints on the size of the adjudicative
process and the implications of these constraints on judicial choices are
more obvious and dramatic than any comparable constraints on the size
of the market and political processes. In fact, it is the relative ease with
which the market and political processes expand that creates demands
which strain the physical capacity of the adjudicative process.
As a general matter, the demand or potential demand for judicial
action far exceeds the capacity of the courts and the problem only
worsens with time. Embedded in the expansion of these other
institutions are several factors that drive the demand for judicial
resources. General demographic changes, such as increased population
damage done, as well as the potential damage, may affect many victims but at a relatively low per

capita level. Many examples of air or water pollution have this configuration of damage. Here,
all the problems of adjudication in the face of dispersed stakes remain for private damages
actions. Here, the problem, in contrast to private damages actions in most areas of antitrust, is too
little, not too much, litigation.

20101

An Outsider's View of Antitrust and the Courts

and increased commercial and industrial activity, often operating
through the market and the political process, increase the demand on the
judiciary in contracts, torts, and general commercial litigation. With
increased governmental activity, the demand for courts as implementers
of legislation and for judicial review under the aegis of administrative or
constitutional law increases as well.
One obvious means for dealing with the increased demand for
adjudication is to increase the size or capacity of the adjudicative
process. In the United States, the federal and state judiciaries have
increased in size. The judiciary, however, has been unable to expand to
keep up with the increases elsewhere and, more importantly, it is
unlikely to do so in the future. The main bottleneck here is the appellate
court structure. This central component of the adjudicative process,
meant to articulate the rules under which adjudication takes place and to
define the rights that trigger litigation, is difficult to expand. Each
judicial system, at least in the United States, has at its apex a supreme
court. These courts are staffed by a small set of judges, often nine like
the Supreme Court of the United States. The most obvious reform,
increasing the number of judges on these high courts, does not easily or
even necessarily increase their output. While an increase in judges
would decrease the per judge load of opinion writing, it would not
decrease the time and effort necessary to reach a collective decision by
this body. In fact, increasing the numbers would probably make such
6
collective decisions more difficult and time consuming.
The failure to adequately expand the size of the adjudicative process
produces the prospect of demand for adjudicative services greater than
the existing capacity can meet. Such excess demand hardly supposes
queues outside courthouse doors. The judicial process has a number of
methods to deal with any excess demand on its capacity. Each of these
methods, however, involves difficult trade-offs between competence,
independence, and bias, and each involves the exclusion of important
areas of societal decision-making from the courts. I have explored these
issues at length elsewhere. 7 For present purposes, it is enough to make
the point that the supply of judicial resources is severely constrained
and that the weak claims for antitrust judicial review and private
damages actions must be considered in terms of this larger picture.

6.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 14-15

(1985).
7. The subject of the supply of and demand for the courts is the general focus of LAW'S
LIMITS, supra note 1, and the specific issue of scale and judicial strategies to deal with increasing
demand are taken up in IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 3, at 142-49.
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I began by admitting my ignorance and must end by doing so.
Almost certainly, I am insensitive to variations in circumstances that
might change the outcome of my analysis. There may be antitrust
settings where skewed distributions produce biased results and,
therefore, where the adjudicative process-either in the form of judicial
review or private damage actions-makes sense. Spencer Waller, in his
comments to me about this paper, pointed out an important example of
private antitrust litigation-consumer price fixing-which may be
characterized as a skewed distribution of stakes with low stakes per
capita for consumers both ex ante and ex post. In these price fixing
cases, a large number of people have paid a relatively small overcharge
because of the illegal conspiracy.
Here, the interests of this dispersed and, therefore, likely politically
dormant group may be severely underrepresented in administrative
agencies because there are no high stakes players to provide this
representation. The competitors of the price fixers have little incentive
to attack the price fixing in the political process. They would instead
attack it in the market where supra-competitive prices attract their
attention and competition. This is, of course, the classic market
mechanism to end price fixing. This competitive activity may vary with
the costs and stakes for entry. But the important point is that, in the
price fixing context, competitors would participate, if at all, in the
market not in the political process.
The only way that small per capita stakes consumers can receive
compensation and, thereby, have their interests directly represented is
through private damage actions. 8 Since this group has low per capita
injuries (low per capita stakes ex ante), however, litigating their claims
will require an augmented private litigation form-either a "bounty" in
the form of treble or punitive damages or a class action. These
mechanisms, especially class actions, have their own set of
imperfections which would have to be factored into any decision on the
9
utility of private damage actions as a response to price fixing.
It is worth noting that, while in the price fixing setting there may be a
good case for the judicial process in the form of private damage actions,
the case for judicial review remains questionable. The minoritarian bias
8. To the extent that there are large purchasers, there may be some active representation
against the price-fixing conspiracy in the political process and, in such a context, there would
again be a weak case for judicial activity including private damage actions. Presumably, the
existence of large scale purchasers would vary across price fixing arrangements.
9. I have examined the trade-off between class actions and individual actions in LAW'S
LtMITS, supra note 1, at 45-51, and the role of punitive damages in IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 3, at 186-91.
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in the political process in the price fixing setting would bias decisions
against prosecution and, therefore, the case for judicial review would be
in review of administrative agency decisions that refuse prosecution. It
is procedurally difficult to challenge such a decision in the courts. Even
if it were technically possible, so long as the losers are a large group of
consumers with low per capita stakes, it is doubtful that there is
sufficient incentive for them even to be aware of the loss, let alone to
challenge it by judicial review.
Price fixing conspiracies appear to be an exception to my assumption
that high per capita stakes actors would be present on both sides of
antitrust issues in the political process and this situation might justify
private damage actions. The situation in private antitrust actions outside
of consumer and small business price fixing overcharge cases, however,
still seems to fit the more conventional picture I have painted. But there
may be more exceptions of which I am unaware. I must leave it to
those more knowledgeable about antitrust to qualify or dispute my case
further.
But if I am unsure of the full picture of the antitrust landscape, I am
far more confident of the analytical framework that must be employed
in exploring it. Any analysis of institutional design in antitrust or
anywhere in the analysis of law and public policy must be made in
terms of a comparative institutional analysis that takes account of the
dynamics of participation of the various interests in all the available and
always imperfect institutional alternatives. I believe that if such an
approach is consistently applied, the resulting institutional designs will
improve. In frustration with the perceived shortfalls of an existing
arrangement, it is common to suppose that something else such as
judicial review or private actions must be an improvement. But in
today's world-a world of high numbers and complexity and, therefore,
a world of highly imperfect institutional alternatives-no such
conclusion can be drawn. It is the comparison of highly imperfect
alternatives, not the listings of the imperfections of any one system, that
makes a case for or against antitrust regulation in general, or antitrust
regulation with a substantial judicial role, or antitrust regulation
disciplined only by the political process in particular. One of these
strategies may be the best, but none of them will be anywhere near
perfect.

